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At the Mind’s Limits and German-
Jewish Symbiosis 
Or, Améry on Guilt and the Possibility of Redemption 
Robert Erlewine 
Illinois Wesleyan University 
At the 50th anniversary of the Jean Améry’s Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: 
Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten, published in English as At the 
Mind’s Limits: Contemplations By a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities,1 this 
work is garnering increased attention in the Anglophone world.2 Perhaps it 
should not be surprising that there is increased interest in this book at this 
moment when our attention is repeatedly drawn to the plight of immigrants 
and exiles, state sanctioned use of torture, and police violence—all themes 
At the Mind’s Limits deals with at length. While this recent attention is 
certainly appropriate, it nevertheless tends to blur the specific and particular 
socio-political and cultural contours of the work. Améry becomes a writer 
about the plight of the victim in general,3 such that specificity of his 
Jewishness is lost and the already submerged theological dimensions of his 
work remain obscure.4  
By reading At the Mind’s Limits in the context of the over-determined 
and highly fraught notion of German-Jewish symbiosis,5 this essay hopes to 
situate Améry firmly within the bounds of modern Jewish philosophy. 
Indeed, while At the Mind’s Limits is celebrated for exposing how the social, 
political and ethical phenomenon of recognition breaks down in atrocity, it 
also issues nothing less than a call for repentance. I argue in this essay that at 
the core of At the Mind’s Limits lies  the possibility, however slight, of 
redemption.  
 
Améry and the Jewish-German Dialogue 
In order to treat Améry, and At the Mind’s Limits in particular, in the context 
of Jewish philosophy, it is essential discuss what is meant by this term. 
Philosophy has often been described as fundamentally heterogeneous to 
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Judaism, such that ‘Jewish’ philosophy is the project of reconciling the 
religious tradition of Judaism with the intellectual insights of the non-Jewish 
world.6 Others such as Steven Schwarzschild claim that there is something 
inherently ‘Jewish’ about the way certain philosophers philosophize.  “It is 
not so much a matter of doing Jewish philosophy as doing philosophy 
Jewishly.”7 More recently Aaron W. Hughes and Michael Zank argue that 
rather than asking about whether or not philosophy is either heterogeneous 
or indigenous to the Jewish tradition(s), scholars should be cognizant of the 
historical rootedness and contingencies of that practice we label Jewish 
philosophy wherever it exists. According to Hughes, Jewish philosophy is—
or has functioned as—an apologetic endeavor whose goal is to “demonstrate 
the tradition at its most rational”8 and to “manufacture” a Judaism 
“comprehensible to non-Jews.”9 Similarly, Zank emphasizes Jewish 
philosophy as a particular form of apologetic literature that emerges in 
response to assimilatory pressures in modernity (particularly modern 
Germany).10  
I would like to push the demystificatory accounts of Hughes and Zank 
a bit further. My claim here is that just as there is no clear, all encompassing 
definition of Judaism, so too there is not one manner of doing Jewish 
philosophy. Indeed, like Judaism, the very nature of philosophy is 
contentious even in—or especially in—academic environments. Rather than 
search for a definition or essence of Jewish philosophy, it is perhaps better to 
understand different works as falling in the genre of Jewish philosophy 
when they engage certain constellations of cultural and philosophical issues. 
What precisely demarcates a constellation of issues as ‘Jewish’ cannot be 
said with any great precision, and certainly not in advance of any specific 
work under examination. Indeed, given the manner in which history and 
culture were themselves matters of grave philosophical concern in modern 
German philosophy and continue to be so in contemporary Continental 
philosophy more generally, it is problematic to neatly circumscribe Jewish 
philosophy to those works exclusively treating Jewish theological matters. 
Thus, in recent years, works by figures such as Heinrich Heine, Franz Kafka, 
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Hannah Arendt are increasingly—
and rightfully so—being incorporated into the canon of ‘Jewish philosophy.’ 
In this essay, I argue that At the Mind’s Limits is a work of Jewish 
philosophy. I do so not merely, or even primarily, on the basis of its unique, 
existentialist reflections on Jewish identity (although one could), but rather 
because it constitutes an important philosophical contribution to the debate 
about the so-called German-Jewish symbiosis. This debate, rich with 
cultural, social, and theological implications is also an essential—if often 
tacit—component in many of the major political and philosophical disputes 
in 20th century Jewish philosophy.  
The debate around the so-called German-Jewish symbiosis, or the 
relationship between Jews and Germans, has its roots in the deep 
1 4 2  |  A t  t h e  M i n d ’ s  L i m i t s  a n d  G e r m a n - J e w i s h  S y m b i o s i s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.792 
commitments to German culture maintained by German Jews.  As Paul 
Mendes-Flohr points out, in the 19th century, Jews, in their struggle for “civic 
equality” found common ground with “the liberal, educated strata of 
German society” in the shared “pursuit of Bildung and Kultur.”11 Middle-
class Jews eagerly consumed German high culture. However, this was not 
simple assimilation or flight from inherited traditions but rather, there was 
something appealing about German culture for Jews (and not only German 
Jews). Mendes-Flohr attributes this to certain correlations between “Classical 
Judaism and German Bildung.” He writes: 
both have a concept of high culture that attributes an intrinsic, 
overarching value to education—grounded in canonical texts—and 
learning; both have a concept of knowledge as anti-eudemonistic 
and hence affirm knowledge as preeminently serving truth and not 
principally the promotion of earthly happiness or some 
instrumental aim; and both uphold an ethical idealism, namely, the 
conviction that education and the quest for knowledge are properly 
dedicated to the illumination of what one ‘ought’ to do in the 
service of the true and the good.12  
Perhaps there is no greater testimony to this profound correlation between 
classical Judaism and German Bildung in that Jewish intellectuals so often 
used the idiom of German philosophy, particularly that of Kant, to interpret 
and elucidate the Jewish tradition.  
The apotheosis of the complementarity or symbiotic relationship of the 
German and the Jewish can be found in Hermann Cohen’s “Germanism and 
Judaism with Foundational Observations about the State and 
Internationalism” (1915).13 In this text written in defense of the German war 
effort in World War I, Cohen argued that Judaism and Germanism were 
inextricably bound up in their essences—their highest values and highest 
possibilities and conceptions of themselves. Cohen is not merely arguing 
that Judaism and Christianity are complimentary, but that Judaism is 
indispensable to German identity, that the two are fundamentally 
intertwined.14 
Perhaps in retrospect, it should not be surprising that Hermann 
Cohen’s notion of the German-Jewish Symbiosis as elucidated in 
“Germanism and Judaism” was widely vilified. Not only did he voice a 
strong nationalism in support of the German war-effort in World War I—a 
stance all-too-susceptible to the familiar stereotype of the myopic German 
Jew rather common among mid and late 20th century Zionist-inflected 
thinking—but also his work, like that of Neo-Kantianism in general, forms 
the backdrop against which so many figures central to contemporary Jewish 
Studies revolted.15 And yet, Cohen’s apotheosis of the affinities of 
Germanism and Judaism was quite in keeping with the sensibilities of his 
generation. Cohen’s rationalist agenda deeply informs, if often negatively, 
R o b e r t  E r l e w i n e  |  1 4 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.792 
the work of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Gershom Scholem, who 
seek something more ‘authentic,’ a term which was as much their invention 
as discovery.16   
Almost diametrically opposed to the position staked out by Cohen, 
stands Scholem’s famous open-letter “Against the Myth of the German-
Jewish Dialogue” (1964) written in the wake of the Holocaust, almost 50 
years after “Deutschtum und Judentum.” In this piece, Scholem claims: “I 
deny that there has ever been […]a German-Jewish dialogue in any genuine 
sense whatsoever, i.e., as a historical phenomenon. It takes two to have a 
dialogue, who listen to each other, who are prepared to perceive the other as 
what he is and represents and to respond to him.”17  Scholem flatly denies 
anything like this ever took place. He finds at least some fault for this lack of 
dialogue with the Jews. That is, “the liquidation of the Jewish substance by 
the Jews themselves must in large part be held responsible for the fact that 
this dialogue did not come to take place as a historical phenomenon.”18 
Indeed, one of the great tragedies of the exilic condition, at least as it 
manifested in Germany, is that the Jews, in their attempt to engage Germans 
in dialogue, forfeited their identity. Scholem writes: “They are no longer 
even Jews, in the full sense of an unbroken historical consciousness, who 
speak here, but rather Jews in flight from themselves.”19 For Scholem, it 
would seem, for the Jew to participate in German culture, he or she had to 
negate his or her essential Jewishness. Where Cohen saw Germanism and 
Judaism as complimentary and even symbiotic, Scholem casts the two terms 
as exclusive, tragically so, such that so many gifted Jews tore themselves 
asunder trying to be German. 
In the wake of the Holocaust, Scholem does not rule out the possibility 
of a future relationship between Jews and Europeans, even Germans. 
Whereas on the one hand, ““[a]bysses are flung open by events,” on the 
other hand, “bridges are built by goodwill. Bridges are needed to pass over 
abysses; they are constructed; they are the product of conscious thinking and 
willing.”20 Jews and Germans remain distinct species in Scholem’s account, 
and even if restoring good faith relations will involve “openness…and open-
mindedness” perhaps more telling is his insistence on “distance” and 
“respect” which demarcate a fundamental gulf, indeed, an “abyss”21 
between the essential natures of Jews and Germans, respectively. 
There is no doubt that both Cohen and Scholem employ ‘Jew’ and 
‘German’ in essentialist ways that strike the contemporary reader as rather 
antiquated, as tropes or types.22  Christoph Schulte, with a contemporary 
skepticism, challenges the very terminology at the heart of the controversy 
regarding Judaism and Germanism. He writes: “what goes by German 
essence or Jewish essence is necessarily fictitious.”23 Indeed, because terms 
such as “Jews” or “Germans” are inherently problematic, Schulte 
recommends that we speak in the “singular.”24  
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On one level, Schulte is undoubtedly correct. Given how many 
different accounts of Judaism and of Germanism have been proffered, and 
how these accounts are often tendentious and mutually contradictory, one is 
tempted to banish them to the dustbin of history. And yet, to grasp the 
power and pathos of the work Améry, who—according to his biographer, 
even as a boy “dreams of symbiosis,”25—and whose later work elaborates on 
an exile that is not merely spatial but also linguistic and cultural, it is 
necessary to engage the interplay of these fatefully intertwined types even if 
they are ultimately essentialist and fictitious. Indeed, many political and 
intellectual developments of the 19th and 20th centuries traded on these 
essentialized types, as fallacious or wrong-headed as they may be. Schulte’s 
methodological caution is no doubt merited, and yet to engage the work of 
Jean Améry is to find oneself caught in a world haunted by the typologies of 
Jew and German, typologies enacted and granted an ‘objective’ reality 
during the Third Reich.  
  Unlike Cohen or Scholem, Améry is not an academic. Indeed, where 
Cohen and Scholem seek master narratives of Judaism, Améry elucidates a 
notion of Judaism born from his status as a “catastrophe Jew.”26 Améry does 
not theorize about Judaism as such, but rather offers an account of Jewish 
identity that is rooted in his own experience, in his ‘I.’27 Améry’s Jewishness 
is paradoxical, torn, between necessity and impossibility; it also is bound up 
with an inextricable relationship with the Germans.  
However, in order to understand the relationship of Améry’s work 
with German identity, it is imperative to first grasp the manner in which it 
articulates both the social nature of the individual and the inherent fragility 
of her identity, whether psychically or culturally construed. If Cohen sees 
the relationship between Germanism and Judaism as necessary, as 
inextricable, and Scholem sees it as merely contingent and precarious, in At 
the Mind’s Limits Améry grounds it in a relationship that is both paradoxical 
and morally significant. That is, in the wake of the Holocaust, Améry insists 
that there is now an inextricable—yet impossible—moral relationship in the 
pairing of Jew and German. Indeed his work specifically addresses the 
German—both of the generation of the perpetrators and those who come 
after—from the perspective of a Jewish victim.28 
 
The Rescinding of Identity and the Loss of the Social World 
At its core, At the Mind’s Limits is a prolonged, iterative meditation—or 
series of meditations—on identity, or more precisely on the repercussions of 
the negation of identity. Indeed, Améry’s meditations, bound up with 
recognition and the ways in which violence degrades an individual’s 
integrity and even selfhood, are profoundly moral in nature.29 One issue at 
the core of the book is how torture and violence exposes the interconnection 
between the body and the mind or self. The vulnerability of the lived body is 
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inextricably bound up with sociality, with recognition. Améry speaks of a 
“social world” that trades not merely on mutual toleration between our 
“fellow man” and ‘ourselves’ but also on the fundamental recognition of his 
right to live, of our obligation to “ease his suffering.”30 Elsewhere, Améry 
elucidates that this social world trades on a notion of “dignity.”31 Dignity, 
for Améry, is inseparable from “[t]rust in the world,” namely: “the certainty 
that by reason of written or unwritten social contracts the other person will 
spare me—more precisely stated, that he will respect my physical, and with 
it also my metaphysical, being. The boundaries of my body are also the 
boundaries of my self. My skin surface shields me against the external 
world. If I am to have trust, I must feel only what I want to feel.”32 Yet, this 
social world, founded as it is on dignity and trust in the world, is 
undermined in torture and atrocity.33   
It is noteworthy that in his justly celebrated essay, “Torture,” which 
was written after, and appears later in At the Mind’s Limits than, his chapter 
devoted to his time in Auschwitz, Améry states: “I dare to assert that torture 
is the most horrible event a human being can retain within himself.”34  
Améry describes torture as the inversion of the social world founded upon 
trust in the world. Améry notes that in torture, the torturer wishes to 
“realize his own total sovereignty” by “negating his fellow man.” That is: 
“The fellow man is transformed into flesh, and in this transformation he is 
already brought to the edge of death.” Torture represents “the total 
inversion of the social world, in which we can live only if we grant our 
fellow man life, ease his suffering, bridle the desire of our ego to expand.”35 
If the normal social world is built upon recognition, upon restraining our 
own sense of self to make room for the other, torture is an “orgy of 
unchecked self-expansion” whereby the self of the other is negated.36 
Torture is not merely the denial of recognition but rather it is the active 
negation of the identity of the tortured by the torturer.37  
Torture reveals that there is nothing about the subject that is beyond 
the social world, and in this profound act of negation, there is nothing that 
cannot be denied and taken away from him or her. Améry writes: “The 
tortured person never ceases to be amazed that all those things one may, 
according to inclination, call his soul, or his mind, or his consciousness, or 
his identity, are destroyed.”38 The victim of torture is reduced to his or her 
body, but his or her body out of his or her control, all exposed flesh.” A 
slight pressure by the tool-wielding hand is enough to turn the other—along 
with his head, in which are perhaps stored Kant and Hegel, and all nine 
symphonies, and the World as Will and Representation [sic]—into a shrilly 
squealing piglet at slaughter.”39  Indeed, this quote reflects not merely the 
ease with which the torturer can destroy the victim of torture but it also 
discloses how this asymmetry—at least in the case of Nazi Germany—
extends to the world of culture.  
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In Améry’s first essay, “At the Mind’s Limits,”—a translation which 
does not entirely capture the full significance of the German title of the 
essay, “An den Grenzen des Geistes” insofar as it fails to do justice to the 
cultural overtones of the term ‘Geist’—he questions the survival value of 
intellectual and cultural possessions such as a “spiritual frame of reference,” 
[geistigen Referenzsystems] and a “well developed esthetic consciousness.”40 
Indeed, the intellect lost its transcendence, its capacity to apply beyond its 
immediate circumstances and to derive meaning from literature and culture. 
Améry recounts how one winter evening in the camp something sparked the 
memory of a Hölderlin poem that had once held great significance for him. 
Yet, now “[t]he poem no longer transcended reality.” It was nothing more 
than “an objective statement.”41 Similarly, when it came to philosophical 
ideas: “Where they still meant something they appeared trivial, and where 
they were not trivial they no longer meant anything.”42 Or as Améry puts it, 
“nowhere else in the world did reality [Wirklichkeit] have as much effective 
power as in the camp, nowhere else was reality so real. In no other place did 
the attempt to transcend it prove so hopeless and so shoddy.”43  
This loss of transcendence coupled with the loss of culture, however, 
extends back to the profound asymmetry between the torturer and the 
victim of torture—or perhaps better—the total sovereignty of the torturer 
over the tortured. To return the passage cited above, torture reduces the 
victim, even if he or she has “stored Kant and Hegel, and all nine 
symphonies, and the World as Will and Representation [sic]” in his or her 
head, to “a shrilly squealing piglet at slaughter.”44  Once this horrific deed is 
done, and “the torturer has expanded into the body of his fellow man and 
extinguished what was his spirit,” the torturer can then “sit down to 
breakfast or, if he has the desire, have a look in at the World as Will and 
Representation [sic].”45 While Améry casts doubt on the cultural and 
intellectual interests of his particular torturers—i.e., he doubts whether they 
actually read Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation—
nevertheless, the chasm that exists between he and they carries over into the 
realm of culture in a way that has direct bearing on the question of to whom 
does culture—in particular, German culture—belong? Just as the torturer 
undoes the mind or soul of the victim reducing him or her to sheer flesh 
through intense physical pain, in the Nazi era the cultural identity of the 
victims—particularly German Jews—were also erased, or perhaps better, 
undone. 
Throughout At the Mind’s Limits, Améry highlights the precariousness 
of the status of the German Jewish intellectual, or the “Jewish intellectual of 
German educational and cultural background.”46 In contrast to Germans 
émigrés such as Thomas Mann, who maintained a distinction between the 
authentic Germany and the false or bad Germany of his present, confidently 
identifying himself with the former, German Jews had no such capacity. 
Unlike Mann, in Auschwitz, the “German-Jewish Auschwitz prisoner” could 
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not “claim the German culture as his possession, because his claim found no 
sort of social justification.”47 An example of this lack of social justification, or 
more properly, its negation and erasure, can be found in Améry’s account of 
a Jewish prisoner, who, when asked by an SS officer what his profession had 
been, answered without thinking, “Germanist.” The SS officer met this 
answer with a “murderous outburst of rage.” Given the premises of Nazi 
racial science, it was not merely inconceivable that a Jew could grasp 
German culture but the very thought of it was an insult to that culture, a 
degradation of it. Jews and Germans, Jews and Germanism were radically 
distinct. Regardless of education and achievement in his or her past life, 
then, “[i]n Auschwitz… the isolated [Jewish] individual had to relinquish all 
of German culture… to even the lowest SS man.”48  
 It was not only German culture that was ripped from the German 
Jewish intellectual, but one was denied one’s identity and history, insofar as 
it had been shaped by that culture. As Améry puts it: “We, however, had not 
lost our country, but had to realize that it had never been ours. For us, 
whatever was linked with this land and its people was an existential 
misunderstanding. What we believed to have been our first love was, as 
they said there, racial disgrace.”49 This is illustrated poignantly in the 
example of the poet, Alfred Mombert, and a letter he wrote, while he, like 
Améry, was interned in Gurs. In this letter Mombert refers to himself as a 
German poet.  Améry challenges Mombert’s mode of self-identifying, 
pointing out that: “only someone who writes poetry not merely in German 
but also for Germans, upon their express wish, can be a German poet.”50 
That is: “His readers of yesterday, who did not protest against his 
deportation, had undone his verses. When he wrote the tragic letter, 
Mombert was no longer a German poet.” Améry explains that vocations 
require “the consent of society. But if society repudiates that we ever were 
[such a thing], then we have never been it.” As a result, Mombert “died 
without a past.”51 That is, even if he had once enjoyed success, had been 
recognized as a poet, indeed, as a German poet, at the point when he was 
interned in the Gurs camp, when he was branded as a non-German, as a 
Jew, by the nation in which he once found his audience, a nation he had to 
conclude overwhelmingly supported what was taking place, society negated 
his identity, not just in the present but also the past.52 And this is true not 
just for Mombert but for German Jews as a whole, “[t]heir past as a social 
phenomenon had been retracted by society” and thus “it was impossible to 
still retain it as a subjective, psychological possession.”53 
 
The Moral Chasm 
The profound asymmetry between perpetrator and victim, torturer and 
tortured culminates in the reduction of the latter to mere flesh, denuded of 
his or her mind and spirit but also of culture and past. Torture as Améry 
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understands it, as we mentioned above, is not merely a denial of the 
phenomenon of recognition; it is its inversion. In the wake of atrocity, the 
unspoken social contract between victim and persecutor, and as we will see, 
between the victim and the larger society, has been shattered. Throughout 
At the Mind’s Limits, Améry emphasizes the profound disconnect between 
victim and persecutor. “No bridge leads from the [victims] to the 
[tormentors].” There is no shared truth, no parity or “parallelism.”54 In his 
justly celebrated account of resentment,55 Améry explains that while torture 
or atrocity involves both the victim and perpetrator insofar as the 
perpetrator commits the act upon the victim, only the victim suffers the 
repercussions. While the perpetrator committed the atrocities, it is the 
victim, in this case, Améry, who is “the captive of the moral truth of the 
conflict.”56 The victim has been damaged, is nailed to the “cross of his 
ruined past,” unable to look to the future, “while the persecutors of 
yesterday manage to find it too easy.”57  
However, it is imperative to understand that it is not merely the 
perpetrator who has done violence to the victim—but the larger society of 
which both parties were once a part—by failing to hold the perpetrator 
accountable, by failing to protect the victim or express outrage at his or her 
injury, also causes suffering.  Améry frequently links the “torturers” to 
“those who helped them, and [to] the others, who merely stood by 
silently.”58 Torture then extends into the social world, and, Améry expresses 
an ever-renewed loss of trust in the world, which is its basis. If the 
perpetrator initiated the breakdown of the unspoken social contract, that 
upon which trust in the world is founded, the bystanders allow this 
breakdown to take place and therefore are also culpable. This “moral 
chasm” persists even as both the “victims” and the “hangmen” are 
gradually dying of old age.59 Indeed, this breach persists even after the 
defeat of National Socialism, and it threatens to extend to future 
generations.60 The larger society out of which the victims and the criminals 
emerged, the society that turned away from the victims and tolerated and 
even endorsed—if only tacitly—the crimes against them, endures despite 
subsequent political upheavals.  And since it has not faced the moral truth of 
what happened, the dynamics of the consequences linger.  
That is, since the world has moved on, since there is no longer any 
desire to discuss the atrocities that occurred, the concerns of the victims who 
desire justice from the perpetrators and the accomplices are unwelcome. The 
victims now find themselves as “Shylocks, not only morally condemnable in 
the eyes of the nations, but already cheated of the pound of flesh too.”61 
Thus, if not only the perpetrators but also the society at large wish to forget 
the crimes of the past, then as Améry points out, speaking in his capacity of 
the victim of atrocity: “I am burdened with collective guilt, I say; not they 
[i.e., the Germans].”62  
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 A moral chasm, a bifurcated social reality, emerges whereby the 
victim lives at odds with the rest of society. The Jew, negated by the 
perpetrator and his willing accomplices now takes on a subterranean social 
identity at odds with the identity of his fellow Germans, and to a lesser, but 
still significant degree, other Europeans. There is no doubt that for Améry, it 
is the victims and their “warped state” that have right on their side.63 To be 
sure, the victim remains trapped in the past, and is denied access to “the 
genuine human dimension, the future.”64 The victim is out of step with the 
“the social and biological time-sense, which is also called the ‘natural’ 
one.”65 But for just this reason the victim is moral. 
Given the profound sociality of morality, its rootedness in mutual 
recognition, the chasm between the victim and the perpetrator is immense. 
Society cast out the victim, rescinded his or her membership, rendered him 
or her “the quarry of death.”66 The perpetrator, on the other hand, acted 
with a clear conscience or at least with the backing of society. For this chasm 
to close, this outrage would have to be undone. That is, since the Nazis 
retroactively rescinded the victims’ German identity, the only way for the 
victim to heal or be made whole—and thus for the wrong to be made right—
would be to negate the previous negation. However, this can only be done 
retroactively.  There was no negation of negation in history. There was no 
“German revolution and with it the homeland’s strongly expressed desire 
for [the] return [of the victims].”67 Rather, the Nazis were defeated by 
outside forces. As a result, for the moral chasm to close, a retroactive 
revolution in the name of solidarity with the victims against the persecutors 
is required.  
As I mentioned, a cleft now exists between a moral ordering of time 
and a biological or social one; the social world is riven between the victim on 
the one hand and the perpetrators, their accomplices, and everyone else on 
the other. For Améry, it is the victim, and the victim alone, who possesses 
“the moral truth of the conflict.”68 Society is not fit to judge, at least not with 
regard to morality, not only because it abandoned the victim before, but also 
because it is only concerned with preserving its own existence. One of the 
great moral insights of Améry’s work is that the much derided and 
condemned feeling of resentment actually possesses a powerful moral truth. 
It prevents the biological and social orderings of time, orderings that 
privilege forgetting and eliding the moral reality of past deeds, from having 
the final word. As Améry puts it: “My resentments are there in order that 
the crime become a moral reality for the criminal, in order that he be swept 
into the truth of his atrocity.”69  
Indeed, despite the austere and often harrowing tone of Améry’s 
prose, his vision is not entirely desolate. Some modicum of redemption, 
however remote, remains possible; the moral order, though badly damaged, 
can be restored. The bifurcation of the social world leaves the victim with 
what Améry calls “an extreme loneliness.”70 Améry provides the example not 
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only of this profound loneliness but also a subsequent restoration of sociality 
or coexistence with one who committed crimes against him, a Flemish SS-
man named Wajs who repeatedly struck Améry over the head with a shovel 
handle.71 However, this loneliness, this disruption in the moral fabric of 
social existence can be rewoven. The victim is not necessarily condemned to 
be alone with the moral truth of the crimes. After the war, Wajs was tried 
and executed for his crimes. “When SS-man Wajs stood before the firing 
squad, he experienced the moral truth of his crimes. At that moment, he was 
with me—and I was no longer alone.”72 Améry continues: “I would like to 
believe that at the instant of his execution he wanted exactly as much as I to 
turn back time and undo what had been done. When they led him to the 
place of execution, the antiman had once again become a fellowman.”73 
When the criminal is forced to face his or her crime, when society does not 
evade its own moral capitulations—or cannot evade them, as when 
Germany was a pariah state in the first few years after the war, a time 
Améry remembers blissfully—then this rift in time separating the victim 
from not only the perpetrator but the rest of society can be resolved, unified 
and harmonized. However, this process is extremely fragile and partial at 
best. Yet it, and it alone, provides the possibility of bridging the abyss 
between victim and perpetrator, and of enabling society to atone for its own 
failures towards the victims.  
 
Redemption? 
Like Scholem, Améry’s work is decisively post-Shoah in nature. And yet, 
where much of the impetus for Scholem’s position can be found in Zionist 
sensibilities from before the war, Améry’s stance on the question of German 
and Jewish dialogue is entirely bound to the Shoah. His very notion of 
Jewishness is inextricable from it.74 Améry’s contribution to the question of 
the German and Jew certainly pertains to the question of guilt, the 
Schuldfrage, but it is much more than that. Améry’s Jewishness stands as an 
accusation to the Germans. If Cohen saw Judaism as correlated with (in the 
technical sense), and thus inextricable from, Germanness, Améry 
understands his status as a Jew as both a provocation to, and indictment of, 
the Germans. Only in this capacity, does the “Catastrophe Jew”75 engender 
the conditions for the possibility of a just coexistence, for a sort of 
redemption by negating the negation carried out by the generations 
involved with Nazism. It offers a way forward, though like the moral 
possibility transcendentally presupposed by resentment, Améry is 
ultimately skeptical that it will be realized in actuality. And yet, one should 
not be mislead by the stoic tone of Améry’s writing. At stake here is the 
possibility of redemption, however attenuated.    
Since the Germans seemed—at least to Améry—a united front, their 
support for Hitler and his murderous regime an unquestionable social 
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reality, the quickness with which they were forgiven and reintroduced back 
into civilization after the war was scandalous for the victims. And since 
Nazism was not defeated from within, Améry stands as a witness 
impugning Germany. If, at least from the perspective of the Jewish victim, 
during the Holocaust “Hitler really was the German people,”76 the negation 
of the Jews by the Germans the only reality, then Améry seeks to engender a 
“negation of negation”77 on the part of the Germans. That is, “[t]he spiritual 
reduction to pulp by the German people not only of the books, but of 
everything that was carried out in those twelve years,” can engender “a 
highly positive, […] redeeming act.”78  While Amery’s animus is driven by 
his resentment, the refusal to forgive or move on can only be understood 
against a horizon that includes the possibility of redemption. 
There can be a reversal of the past through the lens of the present, the 
proud perpetrators of yesterday can now become objects of shame, and the 
Germans of today can express solidarity with the victims. If the victim, with 
his or her resentments is lonely with the moral truth of the atrocities, if SS 
man Wajs at the moment of his execution came to share that truth, and like 
Améry, desired to undo the deeds that had transpired, later generations can 
concretely manifest the desire to retroactively undo the past.79 Améry 
explains: 
[The] two groups of people, the overpowered and those who 
overpowered them, would be joined in the desire that time be 
turned back and, with it, that history become moral. If this demand 
were raised by the German people, who as a matter of fact have 
been victorious and already rehabilitated by time, it would have 
tremendous weight, enough so that by this alone it would already 
be fulfilled. The German revolution would be made good and 
Hitler disowned.”80 
Only this, and not the distancing that comes with time, would allow for a 
genuine break with the Nazi past. Of course, that redemption is possible 
should not be understood as meaning it is likely. However, its very 
possibility is what lends the moral force to the resentment of the victims. 
Their moral loneliness is an abomination; it should not be.   
While At the Mind’s Limits trades on the tropes of Jew and German, it 
is important to note that in its pages Judaism and Germanism are no longer 
abstract, fixed essences; they are identities grounded in specific events, the 
results of the ways in which particular communities did or did not offer,or 
or were themselves denied, recognition.  In the wake of the Holocaust, the 
tropes of ‘Jew’ and the ‘non-Jew,’ or the ‘Jew’ and the ‘German,’ continue to 
haunt the present. It is precisely, then, in this sense, that At the Mind’s Limits 
is a work that contributes to the Jewish-German dialogue. Améry’s project 
targets—perhaps primarily—the generation of Germans who came after the 
Holocaust.81 He is challenging Germans who were children or born after the 
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Holocaust to repudiate the Germany of their parents and to side with the 
victims. 
 There is no doubt that Améry’s work is singular in its illustration of 
the social dimensions of identity and victimhood. The affront to dignity, if it 
goes unchecked, lingers for generations. But the very affront provides the 
possibility for reversal, for turning back to the victim, expressing solidarity 
with him or her, and disowning those elements of one’s tradition—perhaps 
even one’s ancestors—in the name of a redemption. The definitive account 
of the German Jewish dialogue remains to be written, and is perhaps never 
fully sealed. 
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